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INTRODUCTION
This report contains a summary of the workshop entitled 
‘The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf Arab States’, 
which was held on Wednesday 26 March at the LSE 
Middle East Centre. Nine papers were presented to an 
audience that included academics based in the UK and 
the Gulf1, members of think tanks and agencies, and civil 
servants with an interest in the region.
Issues for discussion included:
• Paradigmatic framework: the use of complex realism 
in assessing Gulf foreign policy.
• State formation and militarisation: its causes, quali-
ties and effects on foreign policy.
• The role of the GCC2: identity, cohesion, and foreign 
relations.
• Case studies: Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• Gulf interventionist foreign policies.
PARADIGMATIC FRAMEWORKS
The morning session took theoretical frameworks as its 
starting point. Complex realism, the acknowledgement 
of domestic mobilisation and domestic threats, as well 
as regional and international factors in the analysis of 
foreign policy, was introduced as a framework that may 
allow us to move beyond the ‘black box’ concept of 
leadership in the Gulf. As the effects of the ‘Arab Awak-
ening’ continue to be felt, we are likely to see the emer-
gence of apparently inexplicable twists and turns in the 
foreign policy environment of the GCC. Today, politics 
are no longer contained within the family groupings of 
the monarchies alone, but are rather discussed among 
citizens and expatriate residents alike. A more nuanced 
understanding of domestic environments is required, 
focussing mainly on: accelerated spending and state 
expansion; increased efforts of the monarchies to band 
together; soft power and identity factors - for example 
the maverick political image of Qatar.
1  In this report, the terms ‘Gulf’, ‘Gulf states’, ‘Arab Gulf states’, all 
refer to the Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC).
2   The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 and consists 
of the six member-states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Foreign aid patterns are core tools for understanding 
state identities and, through them, changes in regional 
dynamics. However, the highly politicised nature of Arab 
foreign aid means that it cannot be categorised purely 
as ‘aid’. Gulf aid is difficult to track: much occurs outside 
of official channels, involving cash transactions and a 
lack of reporting mechanisms. It can, nevertheless, be 
used as a tool to support different groups according to 
the prevalent ideology of the day. 
As soon as the current ideology becomes threatening, it 
is discarded in favour of another – which was the case, 
for example, with Arab nationalism. Foreign aid is there-
fore useful for tracing the evolution of state identity. 
STATE FORMATION AND MILITARISATION
Within the last few years, the Gulf has been engaged 
in a continuous state-formation process, including 
centralisation, the creation of new actors, expansion 
of new bureaucracies, and militarisation. However, 
Qatar can be considered somewhat of an exception; 
while its foreign ministry has grown, the multiplicity of 
actors has not. There exist many actors, but it remains 
prone to inertia with its top-down structure and a lack of 
centralised authority. 
The militarisation trend in the GCC states is relatively 
novel, particularly in the UAE and Qatar, who official-
ly supplied military aid to Libya. This was the first time 
they had intervened militarily – constituting a watershed 
in the region. Since 2003, military expenditure in the 
region has tripled, caused by both power projection 
and threat perception, for instance in the case of the 
UAE where state security requirements are growing 
in complexity and many feel under threat from the 
demographic imbalance caused by expatriates, which 
in turn encourages Emiratis to join the security forces. 
However, they also join for the prestige, particularly in 
the case of the airforce, as many relate well with the 
armed forces commander, Mohammed bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan. Identity factors are involved not only in regard 
to the armed forces, but also in the nuclear power 
industry, where there is a set development goal. The 
kind of institutions a state invests in tells a lot about 
how state and society will interact, and what the ‘state 
identity’ purports to be.
Part of these militarisation initiatives must also be 
seen as defence mechanisms to counter Iran and the 
perceived necessity of creating a standardised GCC 
defence structure. Since a single command structure 
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cannot be run with different kinds of weapons systems, 
since 2005, the GCC states have been seriously con-
sidering retooling to enable a more collective response. 
Another factor to consider when looking at reasons for 
this increased militarisation is the role played by arms 
suppliers themselves; they are not only encouraging the 
GCC states towards more spending, but also directing 
their choices in arms and supplies – namely, high ticket 
items such as drone programmes.
While models of statebuilding are important, dynamics 
in the region are still very much about personalities. Par-
allels can be traced between Saudi Arabia’s reactions 
to the recent upheavals across the Arab World and to 
the revolutions of the 50s and 60s, for example, as the 
same people were in charge during both periods. 
The GCC states are pursuing interventionist policies 
as a result of various combinations of assertiveness 
and defensiveness. For some, like Qatar and the UAE, 
active foreign policy is a recent development; for 
others, like Saudi Arabia, it is not. Intervention is trig-
gered by perceived threats, but it is also about branding: 
identity-construction is influencing actions. 
THE ROLE OF THE GCC: IDENTITY,  
COHESION, AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
Though some questioned whether it is still meaningful 
to talk about ‘GCC foreign policy’, given that in the last 
decade, we have witnessed varied behaviour from the 
different states within the regional bloc, participants 
agreed that the organisation still has an important and 
unique role to play. There are common parameters 
around which all the states agree, despite the individu-
al, and at times contradictory, attitudes towards specific 
issues. The GCC also provides a platform from which to 
mediate some of these issues. It can even be compared 
to the European Union, which, similarly, doesn’t share 
a single foreign policy, but does have enough common 
grounds to be considered one entity. 
The GCC has gained much influence through the 
purchasing power of several of its member states. 
However, it has also recently suffered tensions as a 
result of this international footprint, particularly with 
regards to internal cohesion. It is one unintended con-
sequence of militarisation: the regional arms race has 
had the side effect of hindering GCC cooperative ability.
Relations between the GCC and other global players 
have evolved. Particularly dramatic has been the change 
in relations with the United States, whose role in the 
Gulf has been declining, as it pivots towards Asia. The 
Gulf states have watched as the US refused to inter-
vene in Syria; they have seen the failure of past GDP 
handovers to the United States in securing protection 
during the Arab uprisings; and they are now witness-
ing a rapprochement developing between the USA and 
Iran, despite the GCC’s continuing view of the latter as 
a threat. 
The question of whether a ‘post-America’ Middle East 
will be more multipolar depends on wheter the Gulf 
states continue to assume that someone else will make 
the decisions when the US does not. However, the US 
cannot simply be discounted from the scene in the future. 
Although the American pivot has been turning towards 
Asia, it is never about leaving the Middle East. It is not 
a zero-sum game, but rather a rebalancing of attention. 
Participants observed that we should also look at Gulf 
foreign policy towards the rest of the world, not just 
within the Middle East and towards the US. Does there 
exist, individually or collectively, some coherent foreign 
policy towards the rest of the world, and is there any 
sign of greater integration into the international system? 
One must be conscious of a multispeed world with mul-
tispeed engagement, where policies are always under-
pinned by security concerns, and whoever can provide 
security is deemed a friend. The GCC states have the 
ability to pick and choose, to mix and match. They view 
the Obama administration as weak and are already 
mindful of other rising powers. There are, for example, 
more Chinese in Dubai than Americans; and, from an 
economic perspective, relationships at the highest levels 
of finance are being cultivated. There are also many links 
with Brazil and India, and there is clearly robust forward 
thinking going on about where future connections, net-
works and policy orientations should lie.
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CASE STUDIES: QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA 
AND THE UAE
The question of why Qatar still supports the Ikhwan, 
when most of its population is Salafist, was raised. The 
Ikhwan’s long history of involvement in the Qatari edu-
cational system on an elite level, with da’wa, or prose-
lytising, cementing this role, has provided the context 
in which the Ikhwan can perform their usual practice 
of outreach through education and charity, and thus 
expand their influence in the state. 
While the ‘Ikhwanisation’ in Qatar did not happen in a fit 
of absentmindedness, one should still acknowledge that 
the Qatari population is very small (around 300,000). 
Relying on a few resources, like cash, Al Jazeera and 
political links, the Qatari government needed the Ikhwan 
to staff their schools. While relying on these resources, 
their foreign policy is aimed at making themselves as 
important to as many actors as is possible.
There was discussion about the significance of the 
dispute between various Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE and Bahrain seemingly on one side, and 
Qatar and Oman on the other. Participants considered 
whether, with Oman currently siding with the Qataris, 
there would be a division in the GCC, and what future 
lies ahead for Emirati and Saudi relations. Why would 
they side together now when they have experienced so 
many problems in the past, particularly border disputes? 
One participant posited that there is a rapprochement 
between Saudi Arabia and the UAE because the latter 
perceives existential threats around it and knows that 
only Saudi Arabia would do anything to address them. 
This was learnt from recent events in Bahrain. Others 
agreed that the UAE siding with the Saudis is a natural 
phenomenon. Saudi Arabia is not an economic compet-
itor – but Qatar is. The model of the UAE can be replicat-
ed in Qatar, whereas Saudi Arabia does not constitute 
an economic threat. Global business in Dubai cannot 
move to Riyadh, but it can move to Doha, and that is 
where the competition lies.
One participant explored the Saudi regime’s frenzied 
response to the Arab uprisings and its strong distrust of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, both inspired by the conserva-
tive monarchy’s predisposition towards the status quo. 
Four relatively recent losses experienced by the Saudis 
in the foreign policy arena were detailed. First, the loss 
of traditional regional allies as the political landscape of 
the region shifted during the Arab Spring; second, the 
loss of the support of Islamists, who, inspired by the 
results of recent elections to overcome their suspicions 
surrounding the concept of democracy, now appear 
threatening to the Gulf absolute monarchies; the third 
loss was GCC cohesion, with the Saudis having antag-
onised several states and leaders in the region over the 
last decade or so; finally, the loss of trust in the US, fol-
lowing the latter’s refusal to prove a reliable ally during 
the Arab Spring.
The relative position of Saudi Arabia within the GCC 
was discussed. Does it feel its primacy is threatened, 
and does this translate into its foreign policy? From a 
Saudi point of view, the state sees its regional position 
as characterised by its wealth, holy sites, geography, 
and size, it being the largest country in the region. It 
has a superiority complex and any smaller country that 
tries to achieve anything is seen as a threat. In some 
respect, the Saudis have been losing to Qatar; but, then 
again, they don’t actually view it as a unitary state and 
arguably feel superior to it. It was noted that perhaps 
there exists a Saudi push towards hegemony. 
The UAE was used as a case study for analysing foreign 
policy through a regime security lens, observing not just 
interactions between powers but also the dynamics 
inside palaces and society, and how that trickles up to 
foreign policy. It was described as a ‘counterrevolution-
ary’ actor on the international stage. A pattern of using 
soft power to increase the country’s international and 
regional influence up until the Arab Spring shifted after 
2011, when the country, though not experiencing revolu-
tion of the kind witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia, did expe-
rience numerous attempts (many in the form of peti-
tions) at political reform and responded harshly. It gave a 
very clear message that dissent was not to be tolerated. 
It sent soldiers to Bahrain during its uprising, bolstering 
the monarchy there – a foreign policy seemingly different 
from its peaceful tendencies in previous times. 
THE ROLE OF RELIGION
The concept of sectarianism is an important one in dis-
cussions of Gulf foreign policy today. With foreign policy 
drivers coming out of their secular shells, the word 
‘martyr’ being used in the aftermath of police and protest-
er deaths, and Twitter being a fertile ground for making 
comments about religious identity, it was suggested that 
sectarianism is opening a Pandora’s box in the region.
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The importance of the Muslim Brotherhood was high-
lighted by participants. Discourse on the Muslim Broth-
erhood can be viewed in the same light as a sectarian 
discourse, and Gulf foreign policy could be presented 
as a fight over ownership of Islam. One participant sug-
gested that Qatar is trying to ‘steal’ Wahhabism from 
the Saudis. There was disagreement over this point, 
with some maintaining that, while Qatar is promoting a 
new Wahhabism, it is not trying to take over the mantle. 
It knows it cannot outshine Saudi Arabia’s religious role, 
and so it is more likely to be simply shoring up a particu-
lar demographic within Qatar. The relationship between 
the two states is not coloured primarily by religion: 
Saudi Arabia is not reacting to religious threats from 
Qatar, but rather striving to lead the Arab world. The 
Saudis feel the need to be seen as the main arbiters of 
Arab politics. 
GULF INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICIES
Analysing Gulf involvement in regional conflicts, especial-
ly those arising as a result of the revolutions of the Arab 
Spring, is crucial for a holistic understanding of Gulf foreign 
policy today and, indeed, of the conflicts themselves.
Qatar and Saudi Arabia are heavily involved in the 
Syrian civil war. There is significant state sponsorship 
of various groupings, in addition to activity from inde-
pendent Gulf charities and individuals. While many have 
begun to interpret the Syrian conflict in sectarian terms, 
an analysis of the Gulf states’ policies within it reveals a 
much more complex reality, akin to a proxy war, very dif-
ferent to a simple primordial civilisation clash between 
Shia’ and Sunni Muslims. The switching of Gulf support 
between different opposition groups in Syria has led 
to factionalisation among the Syrian opposition. When 
considering the ‘success’ of these Gulf interventions, it 
is tempting to imagine that they have had none – Assad 
is still in power. Nevertheless, with Iran’s influence in 
the region severely damaged, Qatar’s regional profile 
enhanced, and the wave of popular protests making its 
way through the Middle East halted by Syria’s ongoing 
bloodbath, it could be said that many of the Gulf states’ 
goals have, in fact, been achieved. 
Gulf visions for the future of Syria were discussed. In 
the case of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, neither state truly 
knows Syria, and both displayed huge arrogance in the 
belief that they could control outcomes there. Qatari 
policies tend to aim at establishing friendly Islamist 
governments, which they may have hoped for in a 
post-Assad Syria. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is 
perhaps less concerned with what a post-Assad Syria 
looks like in the domestic sense, as long as it stands 
against Iran in its foreign policy.
Qatari and Emirati foreign policy in the Libyan civil war 
also had great impact on their own sense of identity, 
finally becoming states that could intervene in such a 
war. Qatar, in particular, employed all measures possi-
ble towards the toppling of Gaddafi, both military and 
otherwise. They sent twelve aircraft, almost half of their 
combat airforce, as well as troops on the ground. They 
also gave political backing to the opposition and sup-
ported the start of a new Libyan TV station. Both realist 
and constructivist explanations can be given for their 
involvement, from the maximisation of their security 
through accumulation of power and balancing to the 
ideology of pan-Arabism. 
Some participants questioned the emphasis on elites 
acting primarily according to their capabilities, interven-
ing in foreign conflicts simply because they now could, 
and argued rather that there existed some very strate-
gic thinking regarding Syria. For the Sunni Gulf states, 
Syria’s demographics worked to their advantage. Win 
over Syria, and you may get Lebanon, and possibly even 
Palestine. Other participants agreed, yet were cautious 
about disregarding the importance of the attittudes 
and goals of these countries’ respective leaders. There 
are of course good strategic rationales behind certain 
actions, but equally, capability is important. Qatar feels 
in a position to do something, so it does it. It was a 
very unusual time in Libya, with a leader more or less 
universally hated, which provided the opportunity. Qatar 
decided it wanted to invest money, and what it achieved 
was arguably remarkable. 
The complex history of Saudi interference in Yemen 
brings out many of the most contradictory dimensions 
of GCC policy. Saudi Arabia does not see Yemen so much 
as a stage for foreign policy, but rather as its own back-
yard, an extension of its domestic concerns. This being 
the case, there is no clear foreign policy vision. Instead, 
the Saudi approach to Yemen is centred on manifold and 
competing persons and institutions. It is a personalised 
relationship and policy process that predates the crisis 
there and changes along with the individuals in charge; 
for example, after the death of Prince Sultan, who had 
long held the Yemen portfolio. For Saudi Arabia, stabil-
ity and containment are first on the agenda for policy 
towards Yemen. The regime knows that anything that 
happens there will affect Saudi Arabia. 
THE NEW POLITICS OF INTERVENTION OF GULF ARAB STATES 7
Participants also discussed Qatar and Iran’s alleged 
support of the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has 
historically accused Iran of supporting the Houthis, 
but since the recent tensions between Gulf states 
culminating in the withdrawal of the Saudi, Bahraini 
and Emirati ambassadors from Qatar, they began to 
implicate the latter. One participant argued that Iran 
is not actually providing weaponry, but only training. 
Qatar is not involved; the Saudi accusation against 
them is all part of the diplomatic spat surrounding 
the labelling of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organisation. Participants added that studying Iranian 
involvement in Yemen is crucial for understanding 
Yemeni relations with Saudi Arabia and the US. In 2004, 
President Saleh approached the US ambassador and 
instrumentalised the Western contentious relation-
ship with Iran, as well as Saudi anxieties, by labelling 
the Houthi war as a case of transnational terrorism. 
Although it may sometimes seem that way, it is largely 
misleading to think of Yemen as a passive subject upon 
which these foreign policies are forced. Yemenis are, in 
fact, very active in regional politics. 
CONCLUSION
Workshop participants addressed in detail a wide 
variety of issues stemming from the examination of 
Gulf foreign policy. Different paradigmatic frameworks 
were considered, and changing regional relations and 
identities were discussed. New interventionist tenden-
cies of the Gulf states were examined with a particular 
emphasis on Qatar enhancing its military identity in 
Libya, the proxy war against the Iranian soft power in 
Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s personalised policy in Yemen. 
The prevalent idea that Gulf policy-making is like crim-
inology, one can only give coherence to it post facto, 
was sympathised with and yet challenged. A person-
alised approach to Gulf foreign policy was highlighted 
as instrumental. However, participants also agreed that 
these elites must not be seen to form policy in a vacuum. 
Their perceptions of their respective populations and 
political environments will shape their decision-mak-
ing, as will identity concerns. The Gulf comprises many 
expanding states that are at liberty to construct new 
roles for themselves within the regional system and in 
an evolving Middle East, along with the older hegemon-
ic ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Regime survival, regional 
clout, response to perceived threats, new military capa-
bilities, political opportunity and identity-construction all 
play important roles in Gulf foreign policy today.
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